CHAPTER 2
Status of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement
During the 1998 Special Implementation Hearings, the concern most frequently raised was the failure of the federal and Quebec governments to honour their obligations under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement. This situation has existed since our first hearings, held in 1986. At that time, the Commission stated:
- "In the course of Canadian history, a notion persists that governments make promises to induce natives to surrender their lands and other rights and then routinely break these promises, frequently hiding behind legal technicalities. Regrettably, the evidence supporting this notion is extensive".1
Today, while this observation is still true, there may be some cause for optimism. The Honourable Jane Stewart, the new Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, has taken some steps towards improving relations between First Nations and the Government of Canada. The recent "Statement of Reconciliation", issued by the government is evidence of its intention to acknowledge some of the mistakes of the past and to move towards improved relations. The Statement includes two sections that the Commission regards as reason for cautious optimism. The first one reads as follows:
- "Sadly, our history with respect to the treatment of Aboriginal people is not something in which we can take pride".2
This statement does not deal with the historical and current problem of broken treaties, but it does acknowledge a general problem and is a definite step towards reconciliation. The other section deals with the process:
- "Reconciliation is an ongoing process. In renewing our partnership, we must ensure that the mistakes which marked our past relationship are not repeated".3
This statement reflects good intentions. If it is applied consistently and continually throughout the government, the results will be positive. If not, skepticism will deepen into cynicism, crisis will follow crisis in sure succession until some future government finally acts upon those intentions.
With respect to the current concerns about governments' failure to honour their obligations under the Agreements, it is important to fully understand the nature of the problem. After that, workable solutions can be considered. The problem is complex. The Commission believes, however, that it results from the fact that several of the basic concepts of governing processes and structures, while generally useful, are totally inappropriate, and indeed counter-productive, when dealing with treaties and agreements. For purposes of this discussion the Commission shall identify the conceptual issues as the "public mandate issue", the "collective awareness issue", the "corporate memory issue", and the "ministerial impotence issue". Taken together, these issues account for much of governments' history of broken treaties.
THE PUBLIC MANDATE ISSUE
In a democratic society such as Canada, the vast majority of public issues should be defined and resolved through the political process. A few are, and should be, defined and resolved by law. The protection of minority rights in the Constitution is an example of this, applied in a societal context. The idea that governments are in general obligated to honour contracts in much the same way anyone else does is an example applied in a narrower context. In both cases, the rights and duties involved are defined, not through political processes, but by the parties concerned and, failing that, by the courts.
The Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal people are enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35 of the Act constitutionalizes treaty rights, including land claim settlements. This is an example similar to the protection of minority rights in the Charter sections of the Constitution. The parties themselves (government and Aboriginal peoples) work out agreements, or treaties. When necessary, the courts interpret and apply those agreements. This would be quite workable were it not for what the Commission has termed the "public mandate issue".
If one considers for a moment the feelings of a newly elected prime minister and a newly sworn-in Cabinet, the situation becomes clear. In such circumstances, most of us would feel that as democratically elected leaders we had a mandate to govern, make choices and set priorities. This mandate would encompass most of the state's activities. There would be partisan political opposition to some decisions, interest groups would object to certain priorities, and so on. The remedy in every case would be political action. They could lobby, write letters, submit petitions, hold demonstrations or vote for someone else. We would see that it was legitimate to decide, for example, to cut health care funding to the provinces, adjust Canada Pension Plan premiums or reduce the size of the public service. Various interests could campaign against these initiatives; however, making the decisions and objecting to them would both be seen as legitimate and essentially political processes.
The Canadian government undoubtedly sees itself as exercising its powers legitimately in making such decisions about rates of taxation, spending on social services, defence policy, transfer payments, Indians Affairs policy, etc. Indian Affairs officials carry this to the next logical step and see the implementation of treaty provisions as an aspect of Indian Affairs policy. As a policy, it can, of course, vary according to budgetary and other considerations. So the act of implementing treaty provisions is seen as essentially similar to other policy-making, priority-setting and program-management functions of government.
First Nations generally consider the implementation of treaty provisions as an obligation, rather than a policy option. They generally consider treaties sacred. When treaty provisions are fulfilled only partially or not at all, First Nations regard this as dishonourable in the extreme. Arguments that First Nations ought to negotiate about implementation are seen as deceitful and redundant, after all, the Agreement has already been concluded and the obligations have already been undertaken.
Is there any objective truth in these differing perceptions? We say that there is and that it has already been discerned. We believe that the closest we have come to objective truth can be found in the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada since 1982, when treaty and Aboriginal rights were "recognized and affirmed" in the Constitution.
In 1996, in the Badger case, the Supreme Court stated in the clearest language:
- "Treaties are analogous to contracts, albeit of a very solemn and special, public nature. They create enforceable obligations based on the mutual consent of the parties".4
The Court did not say that treaties create "policy options"; it said that they create "enforceable obligations".
Some will be quick to argue that treaties are ambiguous and open to interpretation. Here again, the Supreme Court has provided useful (and authoritative) direction. In the Badger case the Court stated:
- "At the onset, it may be helpful to once again set out some of the applicable principles of interpretation. First, it must be remembered that a treaty represents an exchange of solemn promises between the Crown and the various Indian nations. It is an agreement whose nature is sacred. Second, the honor of the Crown is always at stake in its dealing with Indian people. Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an impact upon treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of the Crown. It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises. No appearance of "sharp dealing" will be sanctioned. Third, any ambiguities or doubtful expressions in the wording of the treaty or document must be resolved in favor of the Indians. A corollary to this principle is that any limitations which restrict the rights of Indians under treaties must be narrowly construed. Fourth, the onus of proving that a treaty or aboriginal right has been extinguished lies upon the Crown. There must be "strict proof of the fact of extinguishment" and evidence of a clear and plain intention on the part of the government to extinguish treaty rights".5
This clearly states that any ambiguity "must be resolved in favor of the Indians". The other rules of interpretation provide ways to understand and apply the treaties.
When one finally understands that treaty obligations are enforceable, and when the labyrinth of supposed difficulties of interpretation is eliminated, there always remains the obstacle of "there is no money". Again, this is a matter of seeing an "enforceable obligation " as a "policy option" or an "expenditure choice". It is not. The more persistent advocates of treaty-obligation avoidance will explain that the Minister cannot spend what "Cabinet" or the "Minister of Finance" or "Treasury Board" has not approved. This reasoning is inherently flawed because treaty obligations are not obligations of the Minister. They are existing obligations of Canada. They are existing obligations of the Cabinet. They are existing obligations of Treasury Board. The proper fulfillment of those existing obligations is a fiduciary duty of the government, that is, of Cabinet. Once again, the courts have provided useful (and authoritative) direction. In the Kruger case, Mr. Justice Heald of the Federal Court of Canada (Appeals
Division) wrote:
- "The Governor in Council is not able to default its fiduciary relationship to Indians on the basis of other priorities and considerations".6
Other priorities are not excuses for default. The problem is that governments have consistently failed to understand that treaty obligations are enforceable, that there are rules for interpreting them and that they cannot be juggled with competing "policy" options.
It is a mistake to include the treaty implementation process in the regular "policy option" and "program management" structure of the public service. The management of an "enforceable obligation" implementation process is entirely different from the management of discretionary programs. Using a choice-making structure to manage the observance of lawful obligations has been dysfunctional.
Some will argue, no doubt, that there is really no evidence of government considering treaty provisions to be mere "policy options" that may be changed at will or simply ignored. Unfortunately, there are numerous examples of both in the older numbered treaties, and in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement.
Treaty 6 is an example of the problem as it affects the older treaties. This treaty, signed in 1876, included the well-known "medicine chest clause". As early as 1935, long before the entrenchment of treaty rights in the Constitution, and long before liberal rules of interpretation were developed, the Exchequer Court of Canada (roughly equivalent of the Federal Court of Canada) had decided in the Dreaver case that the medicine chest included "all medicines, drugs or medical supplies . . . free of charge". In spite of this, Health Canada stated, as recently as 1990, that "no . . . treaties confer on Indians the right to free health care . . ."
The government practice of signing treaties and then refusing to honour them is not confined to the older treaties signed in the nineteenth century and earlier. It also applies to the modern land claim Agreements, as well as to other Agreements signed by the Cree and Naskapi of Northern Quebec.
In the case of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement, as well as various sub-agreements made pursuant to them, there are literally scores of specific federal and provincial obligations that are yet to be implemented. The dispute over the "Statement of Understanding", discussed in detail in our 1986 report is an excellent example.
THE COLLECTIVE AWARENESS ISSUE
Governments are large and complex organizations that deal with a vast number of disparate issues. The departments and agencies are seldom aware of all the relevant activities the others are engaged in. Even the central agencies seem to lack a general awareness of overall issues, other than some specific common elements (mainly financial controls, personnel policy, etc.). As for the implications of this problem with respect to the Agreements, we have observed that senior officials responsible for administering the implementation of those Agreements are unaware of recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada concerning the nature of treaties, how they are to be interpreted, etc. It is clear that the perspective of the bureaucracy is limited to its own views on very specific issues. There is an almost total lack of any consideration of other perspectives. Many of the cases involving Aboriginal and treaty rights that both levels of government have lost could have been avoided if senior officials had been aw
are of (and had chosen to follow) modern legal precedents. The saving of tax dollars, not to mention the good will of Aboriginal people, would have been substantial. Rather than simply acting as counsel to the government in an adversarial role, the Department of Justice should arrange to provide workshops for senior officials to keep them up to date on the evolving law of Aboriginal and treaty rights legislation, as well as on the government's obligations as a fiduciary.
THE CORPORATE MEMORY ISSUE
In both the federal and provincial governments, there is a high rate of turnover in ministerial, senior management, policy and program positions. All too frequently, successive officials are simply unaware of decisions, including those that create enforceable obligations. Occasionally, specific commitments are even repudiated. Most of the problem can be traced to the fact that senior officials are too often seen as interchangeable "generic" managers by the public service. Process skills are considered essential, while substantive knowledge is regarded as unimportant.
The Commissioners recommend that individuals from the levels of director to deputy minister be appointed only from among those who have demonstrable, substantive knowledge of the issues they will be responsible for managing. In exceptional circumstances, some appointees could be required to successfully complete specific substantive training within their first six months in office.
THE MINISTERIAL IMPOTENCE ISSUE
There is a widespread view that, with rare exceptions, ministers make decisions, or appear to make decisions, that the bureaucracy implements only partially or not at all. In some cases, the bureaucracy simply waits for the minister to be replaced. The succeeding minister frequently is unaware of the decision, or is not willing to honour it.
The significance of this is that, unless senior officials agree with a minister's decision, the chances of that decision being implemented are substantially reduced. The credibility of ministerial undertakings when dealing with First Nations is minimal. Examples of this abound in relations between various ministers and the Cree and Naskapi since the signing of the Agreements.
WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?
Three steps need to be taken to restore functionality and good will to the treaty implementation process. These include: an Aboriginal treaty implementation secretariat, an Act for the implementation of treaties and agreements with Aboriginal peoples, and the creation of a court of Aboriginal and treaty rights.
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION SECRETARIAT
As discussed above, the implementation of agreements and treaties involve, as the Supreme Court has stated "enforceable obligations". Departments whose role is selecting policy options, managing discretionary programs or prioritizing expenditure decisions are not suited to fulfilling legal obligations. For that reason, a treaty implementation secretariat that would be totally independent from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development should be created to manage the fulfillment of the government's obligations under agreements and treaties.
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION ACT
In 1982, Canada entrenched Aboriginal and treaty rights in its Constitution. Since then, the Supreme Court has begun to define what constitutes a treaty, developed rules for interpretation of treaties, developed a sui generis definition of the fiduciary role of the Crown, and begun to flesh out the constitutional concepts of Aboriginal and treaty rights. What is needed now is clear legislation incorporating much of this new law into a single statute that would serve as an authoritative guide for government officials in carrying out their responsibilities under the various agreements and treaties.
The suggested legislation, or a piece of companion legislation, a treaty implementation (financial arrangements) Act for example, should clearly stipulate how the financial aspects of agreements and treaties are to be handled. Many agreements and treaties appear to have been negotiated without due consideration of their financial implications. This has resulted in unnecessary disputes, litigation and a lasting bad feeling. An Act governing the handling of the financial aspects of agreements and treaties would ensure proper management of the resources, minimal disputes over amounts, etc., and would force the parties into a more disciplined and open process in current and future negotiations. Even today, the handling of financial matters is the basic problem underlying almost every major dispute brought to the Commission's attention as discussed above.
COURT OF ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS
Because Aboriginal and treaty rights are evolving, legal concepts are being developed and modified almost every day. The volume of litigation on important questions in this area has increased enormously since the 1982 constitutional amendments. This area of law will probably be active and in transition for the next ten to twenty years. After that time, hopefully, most of the major legal concepts will have been developed and most of the thorniest questions resolved. In the meantime, numerous decisions are reversed on appeal. In some cases, the views of the appeal courts are adjusted by the Supreme Court of Canada. All of this indicates that there is not yet a sufficient body of precedents that would allow the lower courts to approach the issues consistently. In addition, the delays and costs of appeals are often excessive.
For all these reasons, Parliament, acting under Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, should consider creating a superior court of national jurisdiction to handle cases involving treaty and Aboriginal rights. Such a court would have original jurisdiction in these areas as well as in cases arising under the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, the Indian Act, the Sechelt Indian Self-Government Act and similar pieces of legislation. In addition, it could be given appellate jurisdiction in cases coming from future First Nations courts. Naturally, an appeal from a court of Aboriginal and treaty rights would be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The justices of such a court could be nominated by First Nations and appointed by the Governor in Council, and the court could be administered as a division of the Federal Court of Canada. After a ten-year period, the continued need for such a court could be reassessed. The body of case law developed by then might have become widely known throughout the judicial system and might be more conveniently applied in the regular courts.
ENDNOTES
- Cree-Naskapi Commission, 1986 Report of the Cree-Naskapi Commission, p. 36.
- "Statement of Reconciliation", in Gathering Strength : Canada's Aboriginal Action Plan, 1998, p. 4.
- Ibid., p. 5.
- D.W. Elliot, Law and Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto: Captus University Publications, 1997), p. 212.
- Badger v. Queen, S.C.C., April 3, 1996, para. 41.
- Kruger v. Queen, 1985, 17 D.L.R. [4th ].